Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Vietnam War: Operations Francis Marion and Pershing
Not long after the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945, the United States perceived a new threat to western Democracy –communist expansion in Asia. The U.S. military first began acting in an advise-and-consent role in Southeast Asia in the early 1950s; first with the French, and after 1955, with the South Vietnamese. By late 1961, the United States began to transition into a direct combat role. Unable to ignore the likely fall of South Vietnam’s democratic government, American involvement ramped up in the mid-1960s, and by 1967 offensive combat operations to secure the border and root out communist base areas were in full swing.
By the end of 1966 Allied forces in South Vietnam numbered more than 1.1 million compared to less than 285,000 communist forces, including conventional troops and militia. Allied forces outnumbered those associated with North Vietnam by about four to one. Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the American commander, was determined to sustain the offensive. While his highest priority was to clear areas around Saigon, he also wanted to secure the Central Highlands, close to the border of Cambodia and Laos, and root out long established communist base areas in the heavily populated Coastal Plain, including the Binh Dinh Province.
Through the Central Highlands, Communist troops from Cambodia and Laos could reach the populous Coastal Plain in a few days or weeks because of the short distance. Infiltration routes and supply dumps were well established. From bases in and around the Coastal Plain, communist units exacted taxes, drew supplies, mustered recruits, and developed political support.
Efforts to undermine communist forces would have been fruitless if the communists infiltrated new forces into the Coastal Plain to quickly replace their losses. The sparsely inhabited Central Highlands offered the best prospect for mustering overwhelming force to intercept such infiltration. The terrain was heavily vegetated and often difficult. U.S. Special Forces teams had developed a network of base camps throughout this region, which enabled local forces to defend themselves while participating in the search for infiltrating enemy units.
Operation Francis Marion (April 5 – October 12, 1967) was the most significant of a series of U.S. operations (including Operations Paul Revere, Sam Houston, and Greely) to secure the border with Cambodia and Laos through the South Vietnamese Central Highlands. Juxtaposed with campaigns along the Coastal Plain such as Pershing (February 12, 1967 – January 19, 1968), these operations illustrate the regional strategy developed by Allied military leadership.
During Operation Francis Marion the 4th Infantry Division designed a defense in depth. Recognizing the hazards of fighting too close to the border, it deployed its main line of forces along a string of outposts and settlements about twenty kilometers to the east. The area in between became a security zone where reconnaissance elements and local forces searched for the enemy. When found, they were attacked by air and artillery or intercepted by Allied forces. Communist attacks on settlements and base camps were almost always repulsed, sometimes with heavy losses.
During Operation Francis Marion, Allied forces effectively reduced communist infiltration in this targeted area. Similar operations harried the enemy elsewhere along the border. Throughout the theater, mobility imparted by helicopters heavily favored the Americans.
Operation Pershing, a year-long effort by the 1st Cavalry Division, in cooperation with South Vietnamese forces, sought to reduce these communist forces and damage their infrastructure in Binh Dinh province. South Korean, South Vietnamese, and other American forces undertook similar efforts elsewhere along the Coastal Plain.
The communists replaced their losses along the border, but found their grip slipping in the Coastal Plain in part because of the successes of Operation Pershing. Local Viet Cong forces were particularly devastated, forcing the communists to increasingly rely on North Vietnamese. By year’s end, over eighty percent of the population of Binh Dinh was deemed to be free of insurgent influence.
U.S. estimates placed overall communist losses in South Vietnam in 1967 at 81,000. But with 200,000 North Vietnamese reaching draft age each year, such attrition alone would not win the war. Preventing communist forces from entering the populated areas of South Vietnam offered the best prospects for victory.
By late 1967, General Westmoreland was cautiously optimistic. Much of South Vietnam was judged to be secure. But events in early 1968 would reveal the full extent of the difficulties that the Americans and their Allies would face.
About ABMC:
Established by Congress in 1923, the American Battle Monuments Commission commemorates the service, achievements, and sacrifice of U.S. armed forces. ABMC administers 26 overseas military cemeteries, and 27 memorials, monuments, and markers, including the Honolulu Memorial, which honors those who fought in the Vietnam War and other conflicts. The names of more than 2,000 Americans who lost their lives in the Vietnam War are inscribed on the walls of the missing at this site.
Recommended Reading
Carland, John M., Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide, May 1965 to October 1966 (Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2000)
MacGarrigle, George L., Combat Operations: Taking the Offensive, October 1966 to October 1967 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998)
Stewart, Richard W., American Military History: The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2003 (Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2005)